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Article 3

MURMURS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Richard Martin Lyon*
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed, and
in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
The Federalist,No. 51 (Hamilton or Madison)I
In his recent book, The Language of Dissent, former Federal Trade Commissioner Lowell Mason tells us that in private practice, he never told his clients

what the law was. Instead he told them "what the bureaucrats thought the law
was." In other words, "by anticipating and observing the rule of man, by
sensing the bureaucratic trends, I saved my 'ordinary citizen' from being the
hero who died financially on the ramparts of liberty." 2
Louis J. Hector, who recently resigned as a member of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, seems to indicate that Mason's procedure, sensible as it may appear to
practitioners, may not be a safe one. The reason is that anticipating and observing the rule of man and sensing bureaucratic trends is impossible where the
administrative agency has no set policy and lacks standards to support its decisions. In his 75-page Memorandum to the President, attached to his letter of
resignation, Attorney Hector observes that the CAB "has actually almost no
general policies whatever ... In almost all fields of economic regulation the
Board proceeds on a pure case by case basis, with policies changing suddenly,
without notice, and often with no explanation or any indication that the Board
knows it has changed policy."' When this happens parties are given no opportunity for argument on the prospective change in policy, nor a chance to present
new evidence in relation to the new policy. In some cases, before the CAB, airlines which "had prepared and applied their cases on the basis of a policy applied
consistently in route cases for three years, suddenly found that the rules had
been changed in the middle of the game." ' Aware of the transmogrification of

agency decisions, staff members charged with the actual writing of CAB opinions
"consciously avoid statements of general principle as much as possible in the
opinions they write, because they must be able to write an opinion justifying an
opposite conclusion the next day, and hence must not be hampered by prior
statements of general principles." 5
* Associate Professor, University of Notre Dame; member of the New York and Illinois
bars; associate in the firm of Sydney B. & Morris J. Wexler, Chicago, Illinois.
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This state of affairs is not characteristic of one particular agency. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, has certain guides for choosing
between rival applicants for a TV license. The law requires that a license should
be granted to one of the applicants if "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
will be served thereby.6 The standards applied in making the choice are imprecise and general. Professor Louis L. Jaffe notes that "they are capable of infinite
manipulation. They can become . .. spurious criteria, 'used to justify results
otherwise arrived at."' Professor Bernard Schwartz writes that analysis of some
sixty television cases involving comparative hearings of mutually exclusive applications "indicates a most disturbing inconsistency on the part of the Commission
in applying its criteria. Whim and caprice seem to be the guides rather than the
application of settled law to the facts of the case. In effect the [Federal Communications] Commission juggles its criteria in particular cases so as to reach
almost any decision it wishes and then orders its staff to draw up reasons to
support the decision." 8
No longer does it appear to be practical then to find solace in the tranquillizing slogan that ours should be a government of laws and not of men.
Woodrow Wilson considered this formula outdated back in 1908. "There never
was such a government," he wrote. "Constitute them how you will, governments
are always governments of men, and no part of any government is better than
the men to whom that part is intrusted."'
More recently Charles Horsky observed that ours "is emphatically a government of men, not of laws; a kinetic force which permeates every aspect of
business, and encroaches more and more on our personal lives." 0
Realization, if not acceptance of these naked facts may explain why writers
on administrative law and process have tended uniformly to title their books,
The Administrative State."
6
7
8

48 STAT. 1082, 47 U.S.C. 303 (1934).
Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licensing, Harpers, Sept. 1957, p. 79.
SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS 151 (1959).
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1908).

9
In his
book, IF MEN WERE ANGELS-SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A DEMOCRACY (1942),
the late Judge Jerome Frank looked into the historic meaning of the concept "government
of laws and not of men" and asked that we:
. remember that its first author, Aristotle, was not talking of rigid, inflexible rules administered by trained officers appointed to 'determine matters which are left undecided by' general rules, and to determine them
'to the best of their judgement.' Why? Because 'the decision of such
matters' in particular cases 'must be left to man.' And this was his conclusion, despite his awareness that men are fallible and despite his assertion
that 'passion must ever sway the heart of man.'
Writing in a period when criticism of administrative law and of the administrative process
was not altogether indistinguishable from disapproval of governmental regulation of business,
Frank exclaimed:
Thus Aristotle, the father of the phrase 'a government of laws and not of
men,' far from being an opponent, was a lucid advocate of the thesis that
discretion and individualization of cases are desirable and necessary elements
of any practicable system of government. If, today, he were a citizen of
these United States, he would be defending the SEC against the diatribes
of those who agree with Roscoe Pound's recent strictures.
10 HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 67 (1952).
11 WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1948); MARX, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
(1957); and with slight deviation: DIMROCK, FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE (1951).

ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The Administrative State has been subjected to frequent investigation by
the executive and legislative branches of the government in recent years, and the
judiciary has provided continuous review of many of its actions.'" The most recent insight into the workings of the federal government's independent regulatory
agencies, the Hector Memorandum to the President (September 10, 1959),
however, provides the most shocking revelations of the administrative process
from the viewpoint of a "participant observer." It deserves close attention coming from an insider. In view of "the inability of Congress to control the policies
of the agencies it has created and the inability of the Executive to coordinate
their policies, all because of the failure of the agencies to make any explicit consistent policy," the Hector Report calls for "a substantial change in the machinery for government control of business."
The Report had the distinction of receiving serious consideration by the
Administration within two weeks of its receipt by the President.' 4 Several statements by agency heads and by the Attorney General calling for a reappraisal
of the economic regulatory agencies followed submittal of the Report. The
Attorney General went on record stating that the "entire field of administrative
law and of government regulation may require a searching re-examination." 5
Perhaps the Report puts undue blame on the agencies themselves and too little
on the national legislature which established them without more than vague
declarations of policy. Congress is not unaware of its responsibility here.' But
at a time when the Harris committee in the House and the Carroll committee
in the Senate are investigating the practices and procedures of federal administrative agencies, 7 the heart murmurs from within the regulatory body cannot
but foreshadow drastic changes in the structure and procedures of the regulatory
agency branch of government. The Hector Report within a very short time has
become a milestone on the road to such changes. It may turn out to be a landmark.
The Report makes three points:
1. Planning and policy-making .. . when entrusted to an independent commission are often accomplished with appalling

12

See

(1937);

REPORT

OF THE

PRESIDENT'S

COMMITTEE

ON

ADMINISTRATIVE

MANAGEMENT

FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Congress, 1st Sess. (1941); Commission on Organization

of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Re port on Legal Services and Procedure (1955); Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Legal Services and Procedure-A Report to the Congress (1955).
13 HECTOR, op. cit. supra note 3 at 29.

14 N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1959, § 1, p. 23, col. 1.
15 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1959, p. 22, col. 2.
16 "Congress in its legislation has placed an impossible burden upon the regulatory body."
STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE No. 5, HOUSE CoMzI. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th CONG., Ist SEss.,
REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST COMM. ON AIRLINES p. 53 (1957).
17 Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, created pursuant to House Resolution 99, as amended by House
Resolution 197 and House Resolution 316, 85th Congress (Chairman: Rep. Oren Harris,
D. Ark.); Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, established pursuant to Senate Resolution 61, 86th Congress (Chairman:
Sen. John A. Carroll, D. Colo.).
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inefficiency' and frequently there is no policy in existence
at all in support of quasi-judicial decisions.
2. The formulated policies of one regulatory agency, where such
come into being, are not coordinated with those of other commissions or agencies of government.
3. Petitioners or litigants before the commissions are not given
a proper judicial hearing, due to lack of known policies and
standards, and lack of familiarity on the part of decisionrendering top agency personnel with the voluminous facts and
findings assembled by hearing examiners.
Lack of Policies
The economic regulatory commissions are generally expected to engage in
policy-making and planning so that the regulated industries operate in the public
interest. Yet it is well-nigh impossible for "regulated" litigants before the commissions to prepare their case on the basis of adhered-to policies or governing
standards. There is no known "common law," and adherence to precedent is
meticulously avoided. Agencies operate on an ad hoc basis and axe reluctant to
cite their own prior opinions in support of present rulings. 9
The lack of agency policies was attributed by the Task Force of the First
Hoover Commission to the fact that top commission personnel were bogged
down by secondary executive and administrative functions within their own
agencies. The Task Force consequently urged that members of commissions
"devote more attention to developing standards and objectives and to planning
the regulatory program." 20 Hector believes that making basic policy should
have precedence even over agency adjudication of specific litigated cases. He
attributes inefficient and ineffectual planning to two principal factors: (1) the
preoccupation of agency members with minor administrative details, and (2)
the reluctance on the part of members to delegate to the commission chairman
such administrative responsibilities for fear that in adding to his responsibilities
they would be deprived of an equal voice in the operations of the agency.

18 HECTOR, op. ct. supra note 3 at 4.
19 The position could be taken that this is administrative law "at its best." Professor
Milton Konuitz observed:
The law is built on tradition and the concept of system informs every part
of it. Administrative law, in intention, is personal, or, if you prefer a
harsher term, arbitrary: it is more liquid, can flow more easily into new
channels, and fill the crevices and interstices which the common law
could never reach. The law is not amenable to what Holmes described
as the 'intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many
unnamed and tangled impressions.' Case law, rule of law, or the doctrine
of stare decisis, is both the letter and spirit of the common law; the spirit
whereby it lives, and paradoxically, the letter that killeth the spirit. Administrative law, on the contrary, was intended to be free of the chains of
tradition; cases were to be decided by administrators, by means which
the common-law lawyer considers extra-legal, and, in some instances, even
illegal. Konuitz, Administrative Law and Democratic Institutions, 3
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSO'HY 150, Apr., 1938.
20
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ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Lack of Inter-Agency Coordination
In the absence of policies it is not surprising to find that the actions of the
regulatory commissions lead to inconsistent results. The CAB, for example, has
the power to suspend the anti-trust laws under the authority vested in it by the
Federal Aviation Act.2 "It does not make sense," Hector states, "for the Federal Government to be diligently enforcing the anti-trust laws through two agencies whilst a third agency on the basis of no coordinated policy is busy exempting
an important segment of industry from these laws." 22
The same inconsistency may prevail within a single agency. Lowell Mason
referring to his responsibilities under the Robinson-Patman Act, described himself as "an administrator of two anti-trust laws diametrically opposed to each
other." 23
Taking the position that Congress will not legislate regulatory policy so as
to provide more detailed guides for administrators, Hector insists that coordination, to be effective, must come from the Executive but "within the framework
of Congressional policy determination."
Since agencies are carrying out the
delegated functions of the legislature, however, Executive leadership is apt to
impair the agency's independence, particularly with respect to its quasi-judicial
functions. Under the circumstances, Hector sees no way out but to split the
dual personality of the agency. The Executive branch would be charged with
direction, coordination and supervision of economic regulatory policies, and a
separate administrative court would handle the adjudicatory task of the agency.
21 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958). The Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws took notice of the problem of exempting private actions approved
by regulatory agencies from antitrust coverage. The Committee cites several examples of
such statutory exemptions:
For example the Interstate Commerce Act provides that "any carriers ...
participating in a transaction approved or authorized . . . are relieved
from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . ." 49 U.S.C., § 5 (11) (1952),
and see 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (9) (1952) pertaining to relief from liability for
rate-making agreements. Similarly, the Shipping Act states that "every
agreement . . . lawful under this section shall be excepted from the provisions of Sections 1-11 and 15 of Title 15 ....
" 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1952).
Then follows a reference to the Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. § 494
(1952).
Finally the Federal Communications Act provides that "the
Commission shall enter an order approving . . . such consolidation
.. ,
and thereupon any . . . laws making consolidations . . . unlawful shall
not apply ....
" 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1952). ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm.
ANTITRUST iEP. 262 n.4.
See also pages 270-76 of the same Report
relating to regulatory statutes immunizing certain private rate agreements,
on agency approval from antitrust coverage. The Committee, however,
did not take a position on the wisdom of such legislative exemptions from
antitrust attacks. Professor Louis B. Schwartz, a member of the Committee,
considered the "proliferation of exemptions from the law" to be "one of
the most disturbing phenomena in the antitrust field." Id. at 288. He
dissented from the "Majority's diffidence" in failing "to advise the administration whether the exemption process had gone too far." Id. at 288-89,
and adding: "Much of the legislation passed in this part of the Report...
was passed during the Depression of the Thirties. It was a time of desperation when we nearly abandoned free competition entirely in favor of industry self-regulation under NRA. Surely it is time for a fresh look at
policies born in this atmosphere. Congress may wish to change its intent."
Id. at 289.
22 HEcrOR, op. cit. supra note 3 at 43.
23 MASON, op. cit. supra note 2 at 27.
24 HECTOR, op. cit. supra note 3 at 49.
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Absence of Due Process
The absence of substantive agency law and policy inevitably leads to procedural unfairness. In preparing his case a litigant finds it "almost impossible
to examine and weigh policies of the agencies because it is almost impossible to
find out what they are. They must be deduced from a string of disconnected,
particular decisions conflicting and seldom articulate." 2
When a case is decided by members of a commission, this is often done on
the basis of summaries or abstracts of the examiner's findings, rather than the
mastery of the often voluminous record by the commission member. The final
opinions, although prepared by the agency staff and supported by facts and
figures in the record, are written to conform to the results already reached by
Board members. When the desired end result is communicated to the actual
opinion-writers "an attorney [goes] through every brief and [makes] a list of
every point raised by every party. Each point of any significance is mentioned
in the opinion, often by the formula: 'We have considered the contention of
to the effect that
, but we find that this does not alter our
conclusion.' "26
This is not to say that the members of the agencies should be required to
digest personally each exhibit tendered. Nor should agency members be required
to have expert knowledge of the many facets of the segment of the economy
which they regulate. To so presume would not be realistic, although legislation
creating an administrative agency sometimes appears to make such a presumption. A former CAB member, testifying before Congress, noted for example that
"the Civil Aeronautics Act implies that a commission of five men can be found
who are experts in political science, military science, the business of transportation, corporation finance, and experts in legislation and the law." 27
Since great reliance on the expert staff of an agency is thus unavoidable,
commission employees should at least have the benefit of formulated and communicated statements of policy. This would eliminate the present state of affairs
in which due to lack of guides, according to Hector, "any resemblance between
an examiner's recommended decision and the final decision of the [Civil Aeronautics] Board .. . is almost coincidental." 2
Special Administrative Court
To permit the independent regulatory agencies to concentrate on policy
formulation and to provide true judicial disposition of litigated cases, the Hector
Report recommends the establishment of a special administrative court to handle
litigation before all economic agencies. An obvious inconsistency exists between
25 Id. at 28.
26 Id. at 37, n. 29; Professor Bernard Schwartz, erstwhile Chief Counsel to the House
Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, confirmed that agency:
. . . commissioners themselves tend to be too remote from the trial and
evaluation of the evidence. The cases are tried before examiners. The commissioners do not hear the evidence at the hearing. They are not required
to read the record. They do not write the opinions explaining their decisions. In fact, the only concrete legal obligation imposed upon them
is that of voting on a case. SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS 189 (1959).
27 REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST CoMM. ON AIRLINES, supra note 16, at 53.
28 HECTOR, op. cit. supra note 3 at 33.

ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
the policy-making function of administrators, requiring frequent consultative
and administrative contacts with representatives of regulated interests, and the
quasi-judicial role of the same officials, which should call for judicial seclusion
from the parties. Congressional committees have occasionally condemned the
practice of behind-doors discussions with interested parties as violating the basic
principles of fair quasi-judicial procedure. The Hector proposal would eliminate
the inherently contradictory role forced on commission members. The establishment of a separate administrative court, furthermore, would bring to an end the
combined judge-prosecutor role of the commissions, which likewise engenders
conflict.
To the administrative court would be referred major litigated cases and
appeals from administrative actions. Hector advances the proposal that jurisdictional standards be set, so that the court will not be overloaded with minor cases.
These would be disposed administratively, but with some right of appeal.
The judges of the administrative court would be appointed for a fixed term
and would be given the true independence now enjoyed by the judges of the
Court of Claims and the Tax Court. Hector believes that a separation of adjudicatory and policy-making functions "would in effect compel active policymaking. No longer could policy statements be mere vague generalities in opinions prepared by professional staffs to justify particular results in particular
cases." 29 To satisfy the administrative court the regulatory agency would be
forced to rule and decide on the basis of declared policy and definite standards.
Predictability rather than surprise would characterize the end result.
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies in 1941 recognized that the proposal had been frequently
made that "the deciding powers of Federal administrative agencies should be
vested in separate tribunals which are independent of the bodies charged with
the functions of prosecutor and perhaps other functions of administration."' 0
The majority, while recognizing that the "commingling of functions of investigation or advocacy with the function of deciding are thus plainly undesirable," 31
was unwilling to recommend such a step. The problem, it was felt, could be
solved within an agency "by appropriate internal division of labor." 2 More
succinctly: "impartiality can be achieved without separation." " The dissenting
minority called for "complete segregation into independent agencies" of investigation-prosecution and hearing-deciding functions in the regulatory process. "4
29 Id. at 72.
30 Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies,
Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, p. 55 S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941).
31 Id. at 56.
32 Ibid. The majority stated:
Creation of independent hearing commissioners insulated from all phases
of a case other than hearing and deciding will, the Committee believes,
go far toward solving this problem at the level of the initial hearing provided the proper safeguards are established to assure the insulation. A
similar result can be achieved at the level of final decision on review by the
agency heads by permitting the views of the investigators and advocates
to be presented only in open hearing where they can be known and met
by those who may be adversely affected by them.
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 209.
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The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) in 1955 renewed the proposal that an Administrative Court of the United States be established. 5 Commenting on this recommendation, Professor Charles Nutting observed that the proposal represents
"a basic desire to restrict administrative action and correspondingly to extend
the function of courts in the administrative area." "6Whether the establishment
of such a court is desirable, Nutting suggested, depends on whether an administrative court, if created, will "bring about desirable control over the administrative process without substantially affecting the advantages of that process... . "
The "fundamental question" which Nutting asked in 1955 - whether the separation of adjudication from the other functions of a regulatory agency may not
jeopardize the effectiveness of administration because of the very interrelatedness
of regulation and adjudication" - is not asked by Hector. This may be due to
Hector's apparent conviction that the worst way to hamper an administrative
program is to operate it without stated and ascertainable policies and standards.
That the present structure of federal administrative agencies is closely intertwined with the ethical problems which have attracted the attention of the
House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight and of other investigating committees in Congress is all too apparent. 9 The proposed change in the structure of
the regulatory agencies might form the basis for attracting and keeping capable
and honorable men on governmental boards. As the situation stands now, Hector
observes the multiplication of inherently inconsistent functions vested in commission members "inevitably raises suspicions of ex parte influence""'0 and occasionally such influence is successfully exerted.
It is difficult to overlook in all this the responsibility which Congress must
bear for the difficulties facing the nation as a result of the apparent near-breakdown of government by delegation. Congress has perhaps taken too literally
Woodrow Wilson's assertion that the "gauge of excellence is not the law under
which officers act, but the conscience and intelligence with which they apply it,
if they apply it at all." ' Only a combined effort by the Legislative and Executive branches of government can provide a much-needed reorientation in thought
and action as regards public policies toward business and business regulation.
The Hector Report deserves the close scrutiny of lawyers insofar as it reiterates the need for basic procedural improvements in the conduct of affairs
by federal regulatory agencies. But far more importantly, its essential value lies
in its questioning the adequacy of the federal administrative agency as a tool in
accomplishing the highly complicated task of formulating and executing national
economic policy. Milton Konvitz, writing "In Defense of Administrative Law"
35
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36 Nutting, The Administrative Court, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1384 (1955).
.37 Ibid.
38 Id. at 1387.
39 Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, Independent Regulatory Commissions,
H.R. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959); Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959); STAFF
REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE No. 5 OF THE HOUSE CoMAI. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1958).
40
41

HECTOR, op. cit. supra note 3 at 64.
WILSON, op. cit. supra note 9 at 17.

ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
in 1938, noted that "underlying a large part of the unfriendly criticism of the
administrative process is a frequently patent intent to hit the end for which that
process is a means, namely, governmental control and regulation of economic
forces and institutions. Superficially the criticism may be directed at administrative tribunals and the manner in which they discharge their functions. Really
the intent is often to strike at the programs which these tribunals are set up to
achieve." ' Even the passage of years has not mellowed the attitude of the business community toward the administrative process.43 The Hector Report, however, does not question the inevitability, under present-day conditions, of governmental regulation of business. Indeed it recognizes the need for a regulatory
process, but one geared to the economic complexity of our times.
The Herculean task of global leadership assumed by the United States rests
upon agreed and defined national and international economic policies and objectives. Speaking of a business enterprise, Peter Drucker once observed that objectives "are needed in every area where performance and results directly and
vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the business."
-The Hector Report
is a plea for management by objectives on a national scale.

42 Konuitz, In Defense of Administrative Law, 72 U.S.L. lEv. 567.
43 F. Trowbridge von Baur, stating that the reviewing courts have been more willing to
upset administrative action which interferes with personal liberty than administrative decisions interfering with property rights only, concludes:
This relative indifference to what a government official may do with private
property has kept public confidence in the administrative process, so far
as the business community is concerned, at least, close to the law of the
nineteen-thirties. And the comment may be made in passing, that while
there is much more to law and life than property rights, most so-called
'human rights' are subtly but indisseverably bound up with property
rights so that an extinguishment of one of the latter is necessarily an interference with the other. von Baur, The Administrative Process: Public
Confidence and the Judicial Tradition, 41 A.B.D.J. 23, (1955).
One is reminded of Daniel Webster's speech delivered in the Massachusetts constitutional
convention of 1820 in defense of the distribution of representation in the Senate on the basis
of property. Webster proclaimed:
Life and personal liberty are no doubt to be protected by law; but property
is also to be protected by law, and is the fund out of which the means for
protecting life and liberty are usually furnished. We have no experience
that teaches us that any other rights are safe where property is not safe.
BEARD, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICS AND RELATED WRITINGS, p. 38 (1958);
Minor, The Administrative Court: Variations on a Theme, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 339 (1958):
"Mhe distrust of many members of the law of the administrative process is no less now
than it was when, in 1887, the then president of the American Bar Association condemned
the embargo Interstate Commerce Commission as unconstitutional."
44 DRUCER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 63 (1954).

